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COMPROMISE AND INTERPRETATION: A
CASE STUDY OF THE BURGER COURT AND
THE RELIGION CLAUSES

Mark F. Kohler*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"[T]he great difficulty of all group action, of course, is when and what
concession to make."'

Since Marbury v. Madison,' the Supreme Court has assumed the

mantle of the final interpreter of the Constitution. Although its success
in that role has been criticized, all of the Court's critics would probably
agree that the task of constitutional interpretation is not an easy one.

Much of the language of the Constitution is imprecise. Historical evidence of the intent of the Framers is often inconclusive or of debatable

relevance. In addition, since the interpretive enterprise is difficult for any
single judge, it is especially formidable for a group of nine.
In interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme Court is constrained

by the institutional requirement that at least five of the nine members of
the Court agree both on the outcome of a case and on the rationale for

that outcome. 3 Although individual Justices are free to write separate
* B.A., College of St. Thomas, 1982; M.A., Indiana University, 1984; J.D., University of
Connecticut, 1987. I would like to thank Hugh Macgill, Thomas Morawetz, and Cheryl Sladicki
Kohler for their useful comments and encouragement.
1. A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 18 (1975) (quoting
Justice Brandeis).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. The Supreme Court at first followed the English tradition of issuing seriatim opinions. See,
e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dallas) 37 (1800). Beginning with the tenure of Chief Justice Marshall,
however, the Court began to issue a single opinion for the majority of the Court. See generally
ZoBell, Division ofOpinion in the Supreme Court: A History of JudicialDisintegration,44 CORNELL
L.Q. 186, 192-93 (1959). Of course, the Court is not always able to build a five-member majority.
For a discussion of the precedential value, as well as the potential harmful and beneficial consequences of plurality decisions, see Comment, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981); Comment, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980).
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concurring or dissenting opinions, 4 in order to obtain the majority opinion, a Justice must have the agreement of at least four other Justices.
The requirement of a five member majority necessitates compromise in
constitutional interpretation. Compromise, in turn, has its costs in doctrinal purity and interpretive method.
An evaluation of constitutional interpretation requires an understanding of the process of compromise. The evaluation which follows
includes a synopsis of the debate over constitutional interpretation and a
case study of the Burger Court's interpretation of the religion clauses of
the first amendment. This case study illustrates how compromise affects
various methods of constitutional interpretation. Although some interpretive methods adapt easily to the pressures of compromise, other methods can be manipulated and distorted by the process of compromise. In
particular, theories of interpretation which allow flexibility in constitutional interpretation perform well under the effects of compromise. On
the other hand, those interpretive approaches which are more rigid, such
as those requiring strict adherence to the original intent of the Framers
or to certain neutral principles, are more susceptible to manipulation.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE DEBATE
During the past several decades, there has been an increasingly vigorous debate over the proper bases and methods of constitutional interpretation.5 The various theories of interpretation can be divided into two
distinct groups. The first set of interpretive theories focuses on the significance of the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution. The second group of interpretive theories is predicated on the existence of
certain judicial norms or principles that serve to restrain interpretation.
1

4. See generally Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986) (discussing the
importance of dissents); Rehnquist, "All Discord,Harmony Not Understood" The Performance of
the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 973, 986 (1980) (suggesting that dissenting
and concurring opinions are part of the checks and balances of the constitutional system). Chief
Justice Hughes wrote:
When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it strongly commends the
decision to public confidence. But unanimity which is merely formal, which is recorded at
the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last resort....
[W]hile it may be regrettable that [Justices] cannot always agree, it is better that their
independence should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be secured
through its sacrifice.
C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67-68 (1928).
5. Much of the commentary comes in the wake of the expansive interpretations of the Warren
and early Burger Courts. See, eg., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
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COMPROMISE AND INTERPRETATION

The Controversy Over OriginalIntent

Much of the recent debate over constitutional interpretation has
centered on the proper role of the Framers' intent in the interpretive enterprise. The competing theories in the controversy over original intent
include originalism and nonoriginalism.6 Originalism places the focus of
constitutional interpretation on the Framers' intent. Nonoriginalism, on
the other hand, places little or no emphasis on original intent. Beyond
this distinction, there is no sharp dichotomy between originalism and
nonoriginalism. Rather, strict originalism and strict nonoriginalism
serve as the endpoints on a spectrum of theories for constitutional
interpretation.
1. Originalist Interpretation
The most common justification for originalism is that it is consistent
with democratic theory. Judicial review, originalists observe, is antimajoritarian. Judges, acting in the name of the Constitution, can reverse
the actions of the democratically elected branches of government. Because of the violence that it can do to the actions of elected officials judicial review must be restrained by intelligible limitations that justify the
intrusion on majoritarian rule.7 Originalists argue that the only appropriate limits are those discoverable in the document itself, and in the
intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified the Constitution.
They contend that the use of the Framers' intent as an interpretive guideline, prevents judges from improperly intruding on the realm of the representative branches.'
A second common justification of originalism finds its support in the
nature of constitutional government. A fixed written constitution aims at
creating a limited government. Effective limitations on government must
6. The terms "originalism" and "nonoriginalism" were first used by Paul Brest. See Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). Others have
used "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism" to refer to essentially the same types of interpretive
theories. See, ag., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-14
(1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTIrrTTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10-11 (1982). Thomas

Grey, who coined these latter two terms, see Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975), has since recanted and claims preference for "textualist" and "supple-

menter." See Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984). Although these
various sets of terms refer to more or less the same types of interpretive approaches, this article
retains the originalist/nonoriginalist language because of its reference to original intent.
7. See Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
823, 825 (1986).
8. Id. at 826-27. See also Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1, 5 (1986); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-4
(1971).
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be predicated on objective standards, external to those standards held by

the persons enforcing them. In constitutional interpretation, judges must
follow standards established before the decision in a particular case. The

only external standards for the interpretation of constitutional provisions, according to originalists, are the Framers' intentions. 9 Therefore,

original intent is "indispensible to realizing the idea of government limited by law."'"
The use of original intent as a guide for interpretation often varies

for different originalist theorists. Strict originalists maintain that the
only legitimate source of meaning for interpreting a constitutional provision beyond the words of the Constitution 1 is the intent of the Framers. 2 By contrast, "moderate" originalists argue that although the
original intent of the Framers is the primary basis of interpretation, other
sources of meaning, such as historical developments since the time of the
Framers, and precedent 13 might be relevant. The principal difference be-

tween strict and moderate originalists, however, lies in their differing resolutions of the problem of changing circumstances and in their respective

tolerance of abstraction from the principles expressed in the Framers'
intentions.
The ease or difficulty of determining original intent for purposes of
constitutional interpretation depends on whether or not the Framers
knew of or could have reasonably foreseen the challenged practice.

Originalist interpretation of constitutional provisions operates relatively
easily when a court confronts a practice or condition that the Framers
specifically had in mind when enacting the particular provision. 14 For
9. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1978); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the
Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 253-54 (1972); Bork, Styles in ConstitutionalTheory, 26 S. TEX.
L.J. 383 (1985).
10. Kay, supra note 9, at 806. Professor Kay notes that the historical inquiry required for
originalist interpretation may not always be easy or produce clear answers. Yet, "[s]ome answers
will be more clearly correct or incorrect than others." Id. at 807. See also Maltz, Some New
Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63
B.U.L. REv. 811 (1983); Maltz, The Failure ofAttacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONsT.
COMM. 43 (1987).
11. Strict textualism is a close cousin of strict originalism. A textualist, however, would argue
that the text itself is the principal, if not the only source of constitutional meaning. For an interesting textualist approach, see Laycock, Book Review, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of
JudicialReview, 59 TEX. L. REv. 343 (1981). For a critique of textualism, see Tushnet, A Note on
the Revival of Textualism in ConstitutionalTheory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985).
12. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383 (1981); Brest, supra note
6, at 204, 222-23.
13. See generally Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1
(1979).
14. This assumes, of course, that the historical sources make clear the Framers' intentions. See
infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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example, most would agree that in adopting the establishment clause of
the first amendment, the Framers intended to prohibit the creation of a
national church."5 If Congress enacted legislation creating a national
church, the application of original intent would be straightforward for
either the moderate or the strict originalist. On the other hand, problems
arise for the originalist when circumstances or conditions arise that could
not possibly have been foreseen by the Framers. It becomes impossible
to ascertain the Framers' intent on issues beyond the Framers' realm of
knowledge.
Strict and moderate originalists respond differently to the problem
of changing circumstances. Whereas strict originalists place severe limitations on the generalization of the principles expressed in the Framers'
intentions, moderate originalists allow a greater degree of abstraction of
these principles.
Comparing the views of Raoul Berger with those of Judge Robert
Bork illustrates two different approaches to strict originalist interpretation. On the one hand, Raoul Berger, a noted strict originalist, warns
against the overgeneralization of the principles expressed in the Framers'
intentions. According to Professor Berger, the basic rule to constitutional interpretation is that "a clear expression of intention by draftsmen
must be given effect." 16 To abstract from the Framers' intentions a principle more general in application than that which the Framers had intended alters the intent of the Framers. According to Professor Berger,
abstraction of this sort is the cardinal sin of constitutional interpretation. 17 On the other hand, Robert Bork, also a prominent originalist,
takes a slightly different tack to the problem of generalization. Judge
Bork notes that the meaning of the Constitution cannot be limited to the
specific conditions contemplated by the Framers. Therefore, some level
of abstraction of the principles articulated in the original intent is necessary. However, Judge Bork would allow abstraction only to the extent
that "the words, structure, and history of the Constitution fairly
support." 8
In contrast with the views of strict originalists, moderate originalists
allow a greater degree of abstraction of the Framers' principles. Ronald
15. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT

FICTION (1982); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-93 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. Berger, supra note 8, at 5. See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2-3 (1977).

THE

17. Berger, supra note 8, at 6-9.
18. Bork, supra note 7, at 828.
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Dworkin, for example, has drawn the distinction between "conceptions,"
which include the Framers' intentions regarding specific circumstances,
and "concepts," which include the generalized principles that can be abstracted from the specific intentions of the Framers.19
The distinctions between these three views on generalization of the
Framers' specific intent are best illustrated by comparing how each
would interpret the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
For example, Professor Berger has concluded that the equal protection
clause was intended only to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of
1866, thus limiting its protections to the right to contract, to hold property, and to sue in court, and was not intended to proscribe racial segregation. 20 By contrast, Judge Bork views the equal protection clause as
prohibiting all forms of racial discrimination by the states, but not other
types of discrimination. 21 Finally, Professor Dworkin, a nonoriginalist,
has a broader "concept" of equality, which would include proscriptions
against governmental gender and sexual preference discrimination. 22
2.

Nonoriginalist Interpretation

At the other end of the spectrum from the strict originalists, nonoriginalists, although not eschewing entirely the importance of the Framers' intent, contend that original intent is neither the only nor the most
appropriate source of constitutional meaning. In light of the passage of
time and of new developments and circumstances, nonoriginalist interpreters look to sources other than original intent to give meaning to constitutional provisions.
Nonoriginalists contend that originalism cannot provide the type of
restraint on judges that originalists suggest is required for an effective
theory of interpretation. Originalist interpretation requires the ability to
determine the Framers' intentions and how these intentions relate to the
19. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). For a Dworkinian interpretation of the establishment clause, see Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the
U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REv. 739, 741-43 (1986) (distinguishing between Framers' "conception" of nonestablishment as the prohibition of a national church and the "concept" of equal religious liberty).
20. R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 117-33, 166-92. See alsogenerally R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES (1982); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill ofRights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A NineLived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1980).
21. Bork, supra note 8, at 14-15.
22. Dworkin, The Forum ofPrinciple,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477-78, 513-14 (1981). See also
Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1029,
1037-41 (1977).
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constitutional issues confronted by the interpreting judge. Many critics
of originalism argue, however, that determining the original intent may
be difficult, if not impossible. First, as James Hutson has recently
demonstrated, there is a significant dirth of reliable documentary sources
of the Framers' intentions.2 3 Even assuming an adequate historical record, nonoriginalists still contend that originalism faces many insurmountable problems. For example, it is difficult to determine whose
intent comprises that of the "Framers." Judges could take the views of
the most prominent members of the Convention or of the authors of the
FederalistPapers to represent that of the Framers. Moreover, whether
one takes a broad or narrow view of who is included in the category of
the "Framers," there remains the issue of how to reconcile the conflicting
views expressed by different Framers on the same constitutional provision. Finally, one must decide how to interpret the Framers' silences,
when little or nothing was said about a particular constitutional
provision. 24
Beyond the problems of determining what the Framers' intentions
might have been in 1787 or 1868, nonoriginalists argue that original intent cannot provide an adequate guide to interpretation because of time
and changing circumstances. Most obvious is the problem of entirely
new circumstances that simply could not have been envisioned by the
Framers.2 5 Similarly, nonoriginalists contend, one cannot tear particular
intentions of the Framers from their historical context and intelligibly
modem social and political
translate these intentions into the present
26
context without distorting their meaning.
A somewhat different attack against originalism is that the use of
original intent fails according to its own terms. Under originalist theory,
if constitutional interpretation proceeds from the Framers' intentions, it
follows that the Framers' views on the rules governing interpretation
23. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986). Hutson, who is head of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress
and who is preparing a supplement to Farrand's edition of the records of the Constitutional Convention, see M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (rev. ed. 1937),
recently made news by discovering a heretofore unknown record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention made by Roger Sherman that may call into question the current understanding of
the Framers' intent. See Mitgang, HandwrittenDraft of a Bill ofRights Found, N.Y. Times, July 29,
1987, at 1, col. 4.
24. See Dworkin, supra note 22, at 482-88; Brest, supra note 6, at 212-15.
25. For the originalist response to this problem, see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
26. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 796-97 (1983). See generally Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretationBe Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1482 (1985).
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should control originalist interpretation. H. Jefferson Powell, in a careful
study of the Framers' understanding of the appropriate methods of constitutional interpretation, concluded that the Framers themselves did not
intend the Constitution to be interpreted using originalist techniques.27
According to Powell, instead of having support in the Framers' intentions, originalism first developed as a theory of constitutional interpretation much later in the nineteenth century.2 8 Because the Framers
themselves did not intend the Constitution to be interpreted from an
originalist perspective, originalism fails to meet its own criteria of adherence to the original intent of the Framers.
Finally, nonoriginalists maintain that adherence to originalism
would result in a loss of much of the best that the Supreme Court has
produced.2 9 Maintaining originalism would require changes so constitutionally cataclysmic, that even originalists would rather avoid them.
Thus, according to nonoriginalists, originalist interpretation is an unacceptable approach to constitutional adjudication because of the inability
to determine to a sufficient degree the Framers' intentions, the difficulty
in applying those intentions in the changing circumstances of the modem
world, the failure to justify itself in its own terms, and the unsatisfactory
results that originalist interpretation produces.
Although nonoriginalists have gone to great lengths to expose the
weaknesses of originalism, they have expressed no widely accepted rationale for nonoriginalist interpretation. For example, Harry Wellington
has suggested that "conventional morality" could guide constitutional
interpretation. Wellington defines "conventional morality" as judicially
elaborated standards of conduct, widely shared in a particular society. 0
27. Powell, The Original Understanding of Originalintent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 902-21
(1985).
28. Id. at 944-48. See also Dworkin, supra note 22, at 493-97; Brest, supra note 6, at 215-17.

See generally Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (early use of originalist interpretation by the Supreme Court).
29. See Grey, supra note 6, at 710-13. See generally Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennialof

the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. Rav. 1,2, 4-5 (1987) (stating that "the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers" was not particularly profound, and that the
defects in the document they drafted, especially with regard to blacks and women, took a civil war
and social upheaval to repair).
30. Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 244 (1973) (quoting Professor H.L.A. Hart). Michael Perry also embraced a theory of conventional morality, see Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function ofSubstantive Due Process,23 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 689, 731 (1976), but
later rejected that position. See M. PERRY, supra note 6.
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Dean Wellington's conventional morality approach, however, has received criticism from originalists and nonoriginalists alike.3 Thomas
Grey, on the other hand, has suggested that the Framers worked in a
natural rights tradition, in which "unwritten higher law principles had
constitutional status."3 2 However, the notion of an "Unwritten Constitution," serving as the basis of nonoriginalist interpretation, has gained
33
little currency.
Michael Perry, who emphasizes the prophetic nature of judicial review, has expressed one of the more persuasive rationales for nonoriginalist interpretation. The Constitution, he suggests, is similar to a
religious text because it "disturbs," calling us to respond to the aspirations embodied in the words and traditions of the text.3 4 In interpreting
the constitutional text, a court should not focus on the past and the original meaning of the text as understood by the Framers, but instead on the
future and the potential for realizing the aspirations of the Framers and
those which have followed them.35 Although he notes that the text and
the tradition provide some constraints on nonoriginalist interpretation,
Professor Perry contends that the ultimate restraint is the authority of
Congress to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts, which
also makes nonoriginalism democratically accountable.3 6
B. Neutral Principlesand JudicialNorms
The second group of theories, those predicated on the presence or
development of judicial norms or principles, is not primarily concerned
with the debate over the role of original intent. Of central importance for
these theories is that the interpretive method employed conforms with
certain norms or principles of adjudication. For instance, Herber Wechsler maintains that judges must decide cases, and therefore must interpret
the Constitution in both a principled and neutral manner.3" A principle,
a generalized rule with force beyond the present case, must guide the
31. See, eg., Bork, supra note 9, at 386-90; Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1068-71
(1981); J. ELY, supra note 6, at 63-69.
32. Grey, supra note 6, at 717. See also Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN.L. REV. 843 (1978).
33. See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 48-49.
34. Perry, The Authority of the Text, Tradition, andReason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 551, 559-64 (1985); M. PERRY, supra note 6, at 97-98.
35. Perry, supra note 34, at 563-64, 569; M. PERRY, supra note 6, at 100-02, 111-12.
36. See Perry, supra note 34, at 572-83, M. PERRY, supra note 6, at 128-34. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl.2.
37. See Wechsler, supra note 5.
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judges' interpretations. Under the neutral principles approach, an interpretation is not principled if it can be used solely as the basis of one
particular decision. Furthermore, judges must apply the principle in a
neutral fashion, so that in a second case, the application of the principle
is consistent with the application of the principle in the first case. 38 At
this level at least, the neutral principles approach is less a method of
interpretation than a requirement for constitutional interpretation.3 9
John Hart Ely, in his book Democracy and Distrust,4° has developed
a theory of constitutional interpretation based on the neutral principle of
"representation-reinforcement." Professor Ely has built his theory on
Justice Stone's famous fourth footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,41 which justified judicial review of legislation that "restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation" or that reflects "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities ... ,42 Thus, for Ely, constitutional interpretation
must be
guided by the neutral principle of judicial reinforcement of the processes
of democratic representation. Ely distinguished representation-reinforcement judicial review from nonoriginalist interpretation by suggesting that
his approach, unlike nonoriginalism, is consistent with representative democracy by "policing the mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent."4 3 Although
he derives the principle of representation-reinforcement in part from
both the constitutional text and original intent, Professor Ely is neither
an originalist nor a nonoriginalist. On the one hand, judicial review
under his approach would not be limited by the understanding of the
Framers. For example, he approved of the voting rights cases, 44 despite
evidence that the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not intend the fourteenth
amendment to protect the right to vote. 5 On the other hand, Professor
Ely rejected the fundamental rights cases that were not grounded on the
principle of representation-reinforcement. 46
38. Id. at 15, 19. See also Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978).
39. See Greenawalt, supra note 38, at 1004-05, 1013-20.
40. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

(1980).

304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Id.
J. ELY, supra note 40, at 101-02.
See, eg., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 52-68; J. ELY, supra note 40, at 120-23.
J. ELY, supra note 40, at 44-70. For a critique of Professor Ely's approach, see Brest, The
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Unlike Ely's theory, Owen Fiss' alternative approach to constitutional interpretation does not rely on neutral principles. Instead, his theory assumes that judicial norms, which define and regulate adjudication,
are adequate restraints on judicial interpretation. Professor Fiss proposes that "[a]djudication is the social process by which judges give
meaning to our public values."' In the adjudicative process, the judge is
to interpret "the legal text, not morality or public opinion." 4 8 Fiss
claims that because the adjudicative process imposes certain judicial
norms, such "objective" interpretation is possible.4 9 For example, the
adjudicative process requires that judges explain and give reasons for
their interpretations. Other judicial norms might also require that judges
take into account the original intent of the Framers."0 These disciplinary
rules, supported by an interpretive community that recognizes such judicial norms as authoritative, prevent judges from imposing their personal
views while allowing them to interpret the Constitution within the limits
set by those norms. 1
The preceeding discussion of the interpretive debate is purposely
cursory. The debate has developed around the issues of what role the
Framers' intent should play in constitutional interpretation and whether
judicially developed norms or principles can restrain and guide constitutional interpretation. With regard to the Framers' intent, strict originalists give great, if not presumptive, weight to original intent. On the other
hand, moderate originalists and nonoriginalists place less weight on the
Framers' views in interpreting constitutional provisions. With regard to
judicial norms, original intent plays a secondary role to that of judicial
rules which require judges to objectively interpret constitutional provisions and give reasons for their interpretations to the public.
Despite the richness and variety of the debate, the process of compromise and its influence on constitutional interpretation has often been
overlooked in the debate. The members of the Supreme Court are sometimes faced with the necessity of having to compromise on their interpretive positions in order to decide a case. The cost of compromise is the
Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Dworkin, supra note 22, at 500-16; M. PERRY,
supra note 6, at 77-88.
47. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1979).
48. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. Rnv. 739, 740 (1982).

49. Id. at 748-49.
50. Id. at 747-49, 754-55.
51. Id. at 744-46. For a critique of Professor Fiss' position, see Brest, InterpretationandInterest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); M. PERRY, supra
note 6, at 123.
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modification and possible distortion of interpretive approaches. The following case study of the Burger Court's interpretation of the religion

clauses illustrates how compromise shapes constitutional interpretation.
III.

COMPROMISE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSE
DOCTRINE IN THE BURGER COURT

The cases in which the Burger Court has interpreted the religion
clauses of the first amendment5 2 illustrate the effect of compromise on
constitutional interpretation. During the tenure of the Burger Court, litigation under the religion clauses increased dramatically. 3 Although
religion clause doctrine underwent significant development during this
period, this doctrinal development within the Burger Court was hindered
by disagreement among the Justices. At several junctures, the Court
fractured on the difficult issues presented by the church-state cases. 5 4 Indeed, the Burger Court's final term came to a close with the Court enter-

ing another period of disunity.

Therefore, a review of the Burger

Court's religion clause cases illuminates the process of compromise and
its impact on interpretation in the Supreme Court.
6
Obviously, the Burger Court was not a single, unchanging entity.

Because of the shifting composition of the Burger Court, it is difficult, if
not inappropriate, to make broad generalizations about the Court and its
52. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-

ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The religion

clauses have been applied to the states by way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause).
53. The Burger Court decided forty-six church-state cases. See infra Appendix.
54. The Burger Court split incomprehensively over the issues of state aid to religious schools,
See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
55. Of the five cases involving religion clause claims decided by the Burger Court in its final
term, two were decided on grounds other than on the merits. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (decided under the Younger doctrine); Bender
v. Williamsport School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (decided on standing grounds). Of the remaining
cases, the Court was significantly split on the merits. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Court's avoidance of deciding cases on the merits
and the substantial division in other cases reflect the possibility that the Court's doctrine is under
reconsideration and that certain Justices may be shifting their positions.
56. During the seventeen years of Chief Justice Burger's tenure, as many as thirteen different
Justices were members of the Court at one time or another. The thirteen members of the Burger
Court and their respective tenures included: Warren Burger (1969-86); Hugo Black (1937-70); William Douglas (1939-75); John Marshall Harlan (1955-70); William Brennan (1956-present); Potter
Stewart (1958-81); Byron White (1962-present); Thurgood Marshall (1967-present); Harry Blackmun (1970-present); Lewis Powell (1972-87); William Rehnquist (1972-present); John Paul Stevens
(1975-present); Sandra Day O'Connor (1981-present).
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constitutional doctrine under the leadership of Chief Justice Burger.
However, using the tenure of Chief Justice Burger as a time period for
study is justified, not because of certain identifiable characteristics of the
Burger Court, but rather because the tenure of Warren Burger as Chief
Justice provides clear starting and ending points for a case study. The
case study reveals that, over time, certain members of the Court adjusted
their positions and interpretive approaches in response to shifts within
the Court. Moreover, voting blocs developed and reformed in conjunction with these shifts and adjustments of the Court's members. Because
the process of compromise so greatly affects constitutional interpretation,
a theory of interpretation must be flexible to withstand the pressures accompanying this process.
The case study has three components. First, a model is developed
for examining the process of compromise on the Court. Second, the voting and opinion-writing patterns of the Burger Court in religion clause
cases are discussed. Third, the Court's interpretations of the religion
clauses are reviewed.
A. A TheoreticalModel for Viewing Interpretationin
the Context of Compromise
The process of compromise on the Supreme Court, and its influence
on constitutional interpretation, is a difficult object of study. The internal discussions of the members of the Court and the preparation of opinions are largely hidden from outside view. Therefore, the examination of
judicial compromise requires the construction of a model that sheds
some light on the Court's activities.5 7
1. The Factors Influencing Judicial Compromise
Four factors influence the process of the Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional provisions and create the necessity for compromise. The first factor is the requirement of majority agreement for a
decision to have full force. The second is the Court's role as guide for the
lower courts. The third factor is the changing nature of the Court and its
doctrine. Finally, the fourth factor is that the Court's decisions are subject to public scrutiny.
The first factor, that the Supreme Court achieve majority agreement
57. The model's purpose is neither predictive nor explanatory. Instead, it is descriptive, offering
a background against which a study of a particular area of constitutional interpretation and doctrine
may be done.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 23:379

for an outcome to have full force, is an institutional requirement, resulting from the structure and process of the Court itself. The requirement
of a majority necessitates that the Justices occasionally compromise on
their divergent views in order to decide a case.5 8 The achievement of a
majority is likely only if some doctrinal concessions are made.
The second factor involves the Court's role vis-a-vis other courts.
The Supreme Court provides guidance on constitutional issues to both
the lower federal courts and the state courts. For example, a Justice
could either encourage or discourage the inducement of a doctrinal concession by emphasizing the need for clarity in the Court's directions to
the lower courts. Particularly in critical cases, appeals to the integrity of
the institution might produce compromise where it would not otherwise
be obtainable. 9
The third factor is that neither the Court nor its constitutional doctrine is static. The changing nature of the Court and its doctrine raises
two possibilities that shape the extent to which members of the Court
may compromise. First, there is the possibility of logrolling. One Justice, for example, might concede on an issue in one case in order to obtain a similar concession in a later case. Second, there is the possibility
that a dissenting or concurring opinion might later become the majority
view. Because the force of stare decisis is considerably weaker in constitutional adjudication before the Supreme Court,60 in several cases, the
Court has been willing to change its previously followed course.6 The
first possibility, logrolling, enhances the likelihood of compromise. On
the other hand, the second possibility, that a minority opinion may later
become the majority view, can make a minority Justice less willing to
compromise.
The fourth and final factor influencing compromise occurs because
the interpretations of the Court are subject to public scrutiny. Although
observers are not privy to the internal discussions of the Court, the Court
must nevertheless explain its decisions and therefore its interpretations as
58. See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 23-24 (1964).
59. Id. at 46-47.
60. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 436-37.
61. For examples of when the Court overruled precedent and adopted the view of an earlier
dissent, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896)); West Virginia State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minerville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
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well. 62

In doing so, the Court has many audiences: Congress, the states,
the parties to the specific case, lawyers, scholars, and the general citizenry. All can have a particular interest in the words of the Supreme
Court. Moreover, they all can take certain actions in response to those
words. The potential impact of these responses on the authority of the
Court, for example, public outcry against a decision, the refusal of state
officials to cooperate, 63 or Congressional attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court,' might influence the process of compromise on the
Court. In particular, the Court may anticipate such reactions and seek
either a stronger majority or unanimity. Under such circumstances, the
Court faces the concomitant need to compromise to achieve such broad
agreement. 65
The four factors above, the requirement of a majority agreement, the
necessity of guidance to the lower courts, the temporal nature of the
Court's existence, and the public aspects of the Court's activities, all fuel
the effects of compromise on the interpretive process. Compromise,
however, is still difficult to bring about. It is costly both to those who
seek compromise and to those who accept it. Therefore, the members of
the Court must muster their resources to direct or withstand the pressures of compromise.
2.

The Justice as Accommodation-Minimizer and
Influence-Maximizer

Because of the constitutional requirement of a majority of five, a
Justice who wants to influence the decision in a case must build such a

majority. 66 Bringing other Justices into the fold can require that the majority-building Justice either accommodate the views of other Justices or
62. See Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: ContemporaryRatification,27 S. TEx.
L.J. 433, 433-34 (1986).
63. See, eg., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
64. See generallyRotunda, CongressionalPowerto Restrict the Jurisdictionof the Lower Federal
Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976).
65. Such was the concern, for example, in the school segregation cases. See Brown v. Board of
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of
Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See also R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 682-99 (1976). However, the threat of substantial negative public reactions may sway the Court to avoid difficult issues.
Shortly after the school segregation cases, the Supreme Court avoided hearing a challenge to a state
miscegenation statute. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). The miscegenation statute was
ultimately struck down about a decade later in another unanimous decision, albeit with a brief concurrence by Justice Stewart. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. Of course, different Justices may play the "game" of majority building differently or better
than others. Justice Brennan, for example, appears to be a highly skilled player. In contrast, Justice
Douglas appears to have refused to play the game altogether. This does not necessarily mean that
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exert whatever influence the Justice might have over the other Justices.
Accommodation and influence are costly, limited resources. On the one
hand, accommodation exacts a cost in doctrinal purity. On the other
hand, the use of influence is limited by time, energy, and the Justice's
personal resources. At some point, the cost of accommodating or influencing another Justice exceeds the benefit of obtaining an additional Justice's vote. Therefore, a Justice seeking to build a majority will attempt
to minimize the accommodation and maximize the effect of the influence
needed to gain the votes of other members of the Court.
The degree to which a majority-building Justice is willing to accommodate other Justices will depend on the distance between the two positions of the Justices and the number of votes still needed to obtain a
majority. Of course, a majority-building Justice will be more willing to
make doctrinal concessions to a Justice whose position is closer to his
own position than to other Justices' positions. Smaller accommodations
will be made before larger ones. Moreover, in an ordinary case, a majority-building Justice will be willing to accept a relatively high level of accommodation to obtain the first four votes of other Justices. Beyond
those four votes, however, the gain of each additional vote is, at best, of
marginal value. Thus, the degree of accommodation that a Justice will
accept is much less.67 In extraordinary cases requiring a larger majority,
if not a unanimous Court, a majority-building Justice has to accommodate a much broader range of views. 68
In addition to doctrinal accommodation, a majority-building Justice
has other resources with which he can influence other Justices to join an
opinion: judicial ability and legal craftsmanship, 69 personal and professional esteem,7 °authority,71 and internal sanctions. 72 Nevertheless, a Justice's influence is limited and must be used to maximize its effect.
Douglas played the game poorly, but rather that he held other values, such as doctrinal purity or
aloofness, more important than winning the game of majority building.
67. See W. MURPHY, supra note 58, at 65. The degree to which a Justice would accommodate
other Justices increases as the Justice nears achieving a majority. However, once the Justice successfully builds a five-member majority, the marginal value of each additional Justice's vote drops off
significantly. Although the marginal value of additional votes beyond the five-member majority is

not nugatory, it is not worth a significant amount of additional accommodation to the majoritybuilding Justice.
68. See W. MURPHY, supra note 58, at 66. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. Not all Justices are created equal. Over the history of the Court, several Justices, including
Justices Story, Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, have been recognized for their superior judicial
abilities. See generally L. BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY (1984); F.
FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1961);
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC

R. NEWMYER,
(1985).

70. Some Justices have been known for their interpersonal skills and their ensuing ability to
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Therefore, a majority-building Justice will use these resources where they
will most likely achieve the goal of building a majority.
3. Coping With Minority Status
Because accommodation and influence are not always sufficient to
build a majority, a majority-building Justice can easily find himself in the
minority. Faced with the possibility of minority status, a Justice has several options: he may join the majority, he may dissent, or he may create
a voting bloc.
First, the Justice can attempt to join the majority to influence the
contours of the majority opinion and thereby minimize its effect on the
Justice's original doctrinal position. This option is obviously open only if
the majority is willing to accommodate the Justice and to compromise on
those issues that the Justice would like to modify in exchange for a
vote.7 3 This alternative is most promising if the Justice represents a
swing vote, needed to create a majority. However, if the Justice represents only an additional vote beyond the five-member majority, the Justice's influence on the majority's opinion is significantly restricted.7 4
An alternative to joining the majority is simply to dissent. The advantage of a dissent is its low cost in terms of doctrinal purity to the
Justice. The disadvantage is that the dissent and its doctrinal purity
might be forgotten in the dusty pages of the U.S. Reports and a few law
influence other Justices. Chief Justice Taft was particularly skilled in this area. See A. MASON,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 198-212 (1964).
71. Because each Justice has a vote equal to the other eight Justices, there is little difference in
terms of authority between the members of the Court. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice has somewhat
greater authority than the other Justices, which can be a source of influence. The power to select the
author of the majority opinions, for example, can be a significant power. Furthermore, the Chief
Justice may select areas over which he may want to have a special influence by writing many of the
majority opinions himself. Similarly, in conference, the Chief Justice speaks first but votes last on a
case, a situation that he might manipulate to influence the other Justices. See generally R.
STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT (1986). Seniority may also
provide some level of authority. For example, when the Chief Justice is not a member of the majority, the most senior member of the majority may select the author of the majority opinion.
72. Justices have various sanctions that they may use or threaten to use against another Justice.
A vote or separate opinions can be employed as sanctions. See W. MURPHY, supra note 58, at 54.
More drastic sanctions include extrajudicial acts, such as cutting off social relations or airing a dispute publicly. Id. at 55. In an unusual example of judicial indiscretion, the feud between Justices
Black and Jackson eventually entered the public arena. See G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE
JUDICIAL REVOLUTION
SON 235-77 (1958).

224-49 (1977); E. GERHART,

AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACK-

73. See W. MURPHY, supra note 58, at 78.
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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review articles." Nevertheless, a forceful dissent may provide the doctrinal underpinning for a later majority opinion.7 6
Another possibility open to a minority Justice is to create a voting
bloc. A minority voting bloc is comprised of two to four Justices who
cooperate to achieve shared goals over time.77 The formation of a voting
bloc entails many of the same tasks as majority building. A bloc-building
Justice must make some accommodations to the other minority Justices
but also must exert influence over them in order to make a cohesive bloc.
Forming a voting bloc may improve the chances for the members of the
bloc to obtain majority status in future cases. However, maintaining the
cohesiveness of a minority voting bloc can be difficult, and can require a
greater cost in terms of accommodation and influence than acting with78
out a voting bloc.
B.

Voting Patternsof the Burger Court in Religion Clause Cases

The following tables79 reveal the voting patterns in religion clause
cases within the Court.
75. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (construing the ninth amendment).
76. For example, in a stinging dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed the hope that the Supreme
Court would soon reverse itself on the issue of the constitutionality of sodomy laws. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1986). (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
77. See W. MURPHY, supra note 58, at 78-82.
78. Id. at 79, 81.
79. The statistical analysis of the voting patterns of the members of the Court, presented in
Tables 1-6, was collected by the author from the religion clause cases listed in the Appendix, infra.
The information in these tables covers all of Section B.
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Table 1: Percent of Cases Joining in the Same Opinion (1969-1986)
Blackmun
Brennan
Marshall
O'Connor
Powell
Rehnquist
Stewart
Stevens
White

Burg.

Black.

Bren.

50.0
29.5
31.8
73.7
63.2
63.2
56.0
31.3
61.4

61.4
61.4
47.4
55.3
34.2
64.0
50.0
29.5

81.8
42.1
44.7
18.4
36.0
59.4
31.8

Marsh.

O'Con.

Pow.

Rehn.

Stew.

Stev.

63.2

44.7
68.4
40.6
47.4

42.1
25.0
52.6

23.1
40.0

28.1

-

31.6
57.9

Table 2: Percent of Cases Joining in the Same Opinion (1969-1977)
Blackmun
Brennan
Douglas
Marshall
Powell
Rehnquist
Stewart
Stevens
White

Burg.

Black.

Bren.

61.1
22.2
16.7
33.3
41.7
50.0
44.4
16.7
55.6

33.3
25.0
44.4
83.3
33.3
83.3
16.7
27.8

41.7
72.2
50.0
8.3
44.4
33.3
27.8

Doug.

Marsh.

58.3
33.3
0.0
25.0
-

8.3

Pow.

Rehn.

Stew.

Stev.

16.7
66.7
33.3
25.0

33.3
16.7
66.7

16.7
38.9

16.7

Table 3: Percent of Cases Joining in the Same Opinion (1978-1986)
Blackmun
Brennan
Marshall
O'Connor
Powell
Rehnquist
Stewart
Stevens
White

Burg.

Black.

Bren.

Marsh.

O'Con.

Pow.

Rehn.

Stew.

Stev.

42.3
34.6
30.8
73.7
73.1
69.2
85.7
38.5
65.4

80.8
73.1
47.4
42.3
34.6
14.3
57.7
30.8

88.5
42.1
42.3
23.1
14.3
65.4
34.6

47.4
38.5
23.1
28.6
57.7
30.8

57.9
63.2
31.6
57.9

57.7
71.4
42.3
57.7

57.1
26.9
46.2

28.6
42.9

30.8
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Table 4: Voting Blocs-Percent of Cases Joining in the Same Opinion
Bloc Members
19697
1978-86
1969-86
66.7
Blackmun-Powell-Stewart
Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun
33.3
76.9
59.1
46.2
Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun-Stevens
Table 5: Voting Blocs-Percent of Cases Voting for Same Outcome
Bloc Members
1969-77
1978-86
19986
Brennan-Marshall
100.0
100.0
100.0
Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun
66.7
92.3
81.8
84.6
Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun-Stevens
Table 6: Opinion Writing

Justice
Burger
Brennan
Powell
Rehnquist
Stewart
Marshall
Stevens
White
Blackmun
Douglas
O'Connor
Black
Harlan

Majority
opinions
16
5
4
4
3
2
2
2
1
0
0
0
0

Concurring Dissenting
opinions
opinions
0
5
5
1
2
2
7
7
2
2
3
1
1

4
9
2
12
2
2
5
10
4
5
2
0
0
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Concurring
in part and
dissenting
in part

Total cases
participated
in as member

3
2
0
1
0
1
1
2
0
0
2
0
0

44
44
38
38
25
44
32
44
44
12
19
5
5
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An examination of the voting patterns shows that several voting blocs
developed within the Burger Court. In addition, the analysis of the separate and majority opinions written by the Justices reveals the extent to
which the Justices were either accommodating or influential.
1. The Development of Voting Blocs
An analysis of the voting patterns of the Court yields insight into
the patterns of compromise within the Court." In particular, examining
the Court's voting patterns reveals that several voting blocs existed and
developed with regard to religion clause cases. As illustrated in Table 1,
The strongest and most durable bloc included Justices Brennan and Marshall. These two Justices joined in the same opinion in over eighty percent of the religion clause cases during Chief Justice Burger's tenure. s
Although several other voting blocs existed in the Burger Court, they
tended to shift in strength and composition over time.
The most significant shift in voting patterns involved Justice Blackmun. As shown in Table 4, from 1969-1977, Blackmun joined in the
same opinion as Justices Powell and Stewart in about sixty percent of the
cases. In the same time period, Blackmun joined in the same opinions
with Justices Brennan and Marshall in only one-third of the religion
clause cases. By contrast, as Table 4 further illustrates, from 1978-1986,
Blackmun joined with Brennan and Marshall in the same opinion in over
seventy percent of the cases." With the breakup of the centrist Blackmun-Powell-Stewart bloc as Blackmun shifted to a bloc with Brennan
and Marshall, Justice Powell moved closer to Chief Justice Burger and
the conservative wing of the Court. For example, as illustrated in Table
2, from 1969-1977, Powell joined with Burger in only about forty percent
of the religion clause cases, and with Justice White in only one fourth of
the cases. However, as shown in Table 3, in 1978-1986, Powell joined in
the same opinion as the Chief Justice in over seventy percent of the cases
and in the same opinion as Justice White in almost sixty percent of the
cases.
A similar shift occured when Justice O'Connor was appointed to the
Court in 1981, replacing Justice Stewart. Unlike Justice Stewart, who
80. For a similar discussion of the Burger Court, see Galloway, The Burger Court (1969-1986),
27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 31 (1987).
81. Moreover, Brennan and Marshall voted for the same outcome in every one of the Burger
Court's religion clause cases.
82. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun voted for the same outcome as Justices Brennan and Marshall in over ninety percent of the cases in the period from 1978 to 1986. See Table 5.
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had voted with the centrist voting bloc that included himself, Justice
Blackmun, and Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor tended to vote more
often with the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, evidencing the further
3
development of a sharply divided Court.1
The formation of the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun bloc coincided
roughly with the appointment of Justice Stevens who replaced Justice
Douglas in 1975.84 Like Douglas, Justice Stevens tended to assert a degree of independence. As shown in Table 5, from 1978 to 1986, Stevens
voted with the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun bloc in over eighty percent
of the cases. However, during that time period, he joined the same opinion with those three Justices in less than half of the religion clause cases.
Thus, Stevens was not a fully-committed member of the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun minority voting bloc. Although he voted with the bloc,
he often wrote separate opinions expressing a slightly different perspective on the issues presented by the cases. 85
2.

Patterns in Opinion Writing

The formation of the strong Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun bloc with
Justice Stevens as an occasional fellow traveler, appears to be largely the
result of successful efforts by Justice Brennan. The evidence of Brennan's leadership in the formation of the bloc is threefold. First, Brennan
was the Justice with whom Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined in
the same opinion most often during the period from 1978 to 1986. Second, of the members of the bloc, Brennan was the principal opinion
writer.8 6 Finally, Brennan was one of the most significant members of
8 7
the bloc in the development of religion clause doctrine.
In addition to the conclusions drawn from analyzing the Burger
Court's voting patterns in religion clause cases, the patterns in opinion
writing by the Court provide additional evidence of the process of compromise. Table 6, above, compares the number of majority opinions
written by the Justices with the number of separate opinions they wrote.
83. See Table 3.
84. Justice Douglas was most noteworthy for his independence from the rest of the members of
the Court. Douglas joined in the same opinion more than fifty percent of the time with only one
Justice, Marshall. In fact, he joined in the same opinion as Justice White in less than ten percent of
the cases. His voting patterns reinforce the conclusion that Douglas had little interest in accommodation and compromise in constitutional adjudication.
85. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinburger, 475 U.S. 503, 510-12 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261-64 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. See Table 6.
87. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
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An examination of how many majority opinions each Justice wrote can
indicate how influential he or she was. On the other hand, an analysis of
the separate opinions reflects the extent to which individual Justices were
both accommodating and accommodated.
As illustrated in Table 6 above, Chief Justice Burger, who wrote
sixteen of the forty majority opinions, was a highly influential member of
the Court. The fact that Burger wrote forty percent of the majority opinions in religion clause cases during his tenure reflects more than his personal interest in the area. First, it illustrates the use of his authority as
Chief Justice. By appointing himself as the author of the majority opinions,88 he was able to have a strong hand in shaping the direction of the
Court's interpretation of the religion clauses. Second, it demonstrates his
success, if not in forging the majorities himself, at least in participating in
them. If authorship of majority opinions can be taken as a rough measure of a Justice's influence, then Justices Burger, Brennan, Powell, and
Rehnquist were relatively influential Justices in religion clause cases. On
the other hand, Justices Marshall, Stevens, White, Blackmun, O'Connor,
and Douglas were relatively uninfluential in these cases.
Additional insights can be gleaned from the examination of the
number of separate opinions written by the Justices. In particular, a Justice's separate opinion exposes that Justice's individual doctrinal and interpretive views. Also, the presence of a separate opinion reflects
disagreement among the court's members and the potential failure of the
process of compromise. Justice White was the most prolific separate
opinion writer, having written nineteen such opinions. Justice Brennan
wrote sixteen separate opinions, Justice Rehnquist fourteen, and Justice
Stevens thirteen. Similarly, Justice Douglas was the author of seven separate opinions, even though he sat on the Court in only twelve cases, and
Justice O'Connor also wrote seven separate opinions, although she was
part of the Court in only nineteen cases.
More interesting than the aggregate number of separate opinions is
the breakdown of these opinions into concurrences and dissents. For instance, Justice Rehnquist wrote twelve dissenting opinions and only one
concurring opinion. Similarly, Justice Brennan had nine dissents, but
five concurrences. Justice Douglas wrote five dissents, over forty percent
of the cases he participated in, and only two concurrences. Justice White
had a more balanced division, with ten dissents and seven concurrences.
88. See supra note 71.
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By contrast, Justice Stevens wrote seven concurrences and only five
dissents.
Concurrences and dissents have different purposes and convey different messages, depending on whether one takes a doctrinal perspective,
or whether one looks at them from the viewpoint of the decision making
process. From a doctrinal perspective, a concurrence expresses general
agreement with respect to the outcome of a case, but suggests an additional factor to consider or an alternate approach required to reach the
same result. A dissent, however, often registers disagreement, both with
the outcome and the approach of the majority. By contrast, from the
viewpoint of the decision making process, a concurring opinion reflects a
situation in which the Justice, despite the fact that he voted with the
majority, was unaccommodated by the majority. Another possibility is
that a concurring Justice, hoping to influence a future majority, uses the
present concurrence as a springboard. 9 Dissents can also expose two
possible developments in the process of compromise. On the one hand, a
dissenting Justice may be one whom the majority refused to accommodate, or who failed to influence at least four other Justices. On the other
hand, a dissenting Justice might not have hoped to influence the members of the opposing majority at all. More likely, such a Justice might try
to induce other dissenting Justices to form a minority bloc,9° with the
possibility of capturing additional votes to gain a future majority.
The extent to which the Justices were accommodating or influential
is illustrated by the number of concurrences, dissents and majority opinions they wrote. Justice Douglas would appear to be the best example of
a Justice whose positions were often not accommodated. This is because
he probably neither sought to be accommodated nor sought to accommodate others. The fact that Justice Rehnquist had a high number of dissents compared to his few concurrences might illustrate that his views
were not quickly accommodated by majority-building Justices. However, the relatively high number of majority opinions that he wrote demonstrates that he did retain some influence in the Court. The same might
be said to a lesser degree about Justice Brennan. Brennan appears either
to have been more accommodating or more influential than Rehnquist, in
light of the fact that he wrote fewer dissents, more concurrences, and
only several majority opinions. Justice White appears to have been less
89. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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successful than Brennan in accommodating and influencing other Justices, since White wrote a large number of concurring and dissenting
opinions and relatively few majority opinions. Meanwhile, Justices Stevens and O'Connor appear, at least on the basis that they wrote more
concurring opinions than dissenting, to have hoped to influence doctrinal
developments but were not accommodated by majority-building Justices.
The study of the raw data of opinion and voting patterns shows that
several voting blocs developed within the Burger Court with regard to
the religion clause cases. Initially, a centrist bloc included Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Stewart. Midway through the Burger Court's
tenure, that bloc disintegrated. Justice Blackmun joined a minority bloc
with Justices Brennan and Marshall, and Justice Powell became more
closely tied to the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. Similarly, upon
succeeding Justice Stewart, Justice O'Connor moved closer to Burger
and Rehnquist than her predecessor had been.
The review of opinion patterns also demonstrates that the Chief Justice had a significant voice in the interpretation of the religion clauses
and appears to have been a fairly successful majority builder. Justice
White was far less successful. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist both occasionally found that the majority was unwilling to accommodate them.
Nevertheless, both were relatively successful in accommodating and influencing others and in majority building. Of the two, Brennan had
greater success, resulting from his ability to fashion an effective minority
voting bloc. In short, Brennan seemed to be a consummate player of the
compromise game.
C.

The Burger Court and the Interpretationof the Religion Clauses

Although the constitutional doctrine of the religion clauses was relatively undeveloped at the time Burger took over as Chief Justice,9 1 an
increased volume of litigation involving the religion clauses provided the
Burger Court many opportunities to interpret and reinterpret the clauses.
Nevertheless, because the members of the Burger Court held widely divergent views on the proper interpretation of the establishment and free
91. For the principal pre-Burger Court establishment clause cases, see Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). For the principal pre-Burger Court, free exercise cases, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.

145 (1878).
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exercise clauses, the Burger Court's religion clause doctrine was often in
a state of flux and received sharp criticism from within and without the
Court. In order to understand the Justices' individual interpretations of
the religion clauses, it is useful to review the Court's doctrine as was
followed by at least a majority of the Court.92
Following the approach of earlier cases, the Burger Court developed
a bifurcated analysis of the religion clauses, assuming that each of the
two clauses represented distinct values. On the one hand, the establishment clause reflected the need to prevent the "sponsorship, financial sup'93
port, and the active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.
On the other hand, the free exercise clause aimed at restraining state
interference with religious activity. For each clause, therefore, a separate
analysis was necessary. 94
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,9 5 the Court announced a three part "test"
for establishment clause claims. First, the statute had to have a secular
legislative purpose. Second, its primary effect had to be one that neither
advanced nor inhibited religion. Third, the statute could not foster an
"excessive entanglement with religion." 9 6 Thus, under the first prong of
the Lemon test, a statute would be struck down if it had a purely religious purpose or goal.97 Even if the purpose was secular, the statute
would violate the establishment clause under the second prong of the
test if its primary effect was religious.9 8 Finally, under the third prong, a
statute could still be unconstitutional despite a secular purpose and effect, if it resulted in "excessive entanglement" between church and state.
The entanglement prong was to prohibit "comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance" of religious activities.99 The Court
92. See generally L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT (1984); Kurland,
The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1984); Redlich, Separation of
Church and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1094 (1985).

93. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
94. Although the Court's bifurcated approach has been criticized by commentators, see, e.g.,
Kurland, Of Church andState and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961), the members of
the Court have all continued to follow it.
95. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
96. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
97. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (statute providing for a "moment of silence" in
public school had an invalid religious purpose).
98. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (statute giving employees
an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath had a primary effect of advancing religion)
with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (suggesting that a school's policy of equal access
including religious groups did not have a primary effect of advancing religion).
99. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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also struck down statutes that raised the potential for political entanglement between church and state if the challenged governmental assistance
to religious entities could cause political divisiveness along religious
A potentially overwhelming exception to the Lemon test devellines."
oped later in the Burger Court's tenure. Twice in the early 1980's, the
Court rejected establishment clause challenges to activities that had longstanding historical acceptance.101 Although some commentators
prophesied the downfall of the Lemon standard after the historical-acceptance cases, 102 the Lemon test received a reaffirmation shortly
thereafter. 103
In the free exercise clause cases, the Burger Court continued to employ an interest-balancing test developed in earlier cases."m Under this
balancing test, the Court must first determine whether a state action burdens the exercise of religious beliefs or practices. Therefore, the inquiry
must initially determine whether the asserted belief is indeed a religious
one, rather than one merely grounded in philosophy or personal preference,10 5 and whether the belief is sincere.10 6 Assuming that the belief is
religious, the balancing test then requires the Court to find that the state
action coerces an individual to modify or to forgo the belief or practice in
order to comply with the state action.10 7 Of course, a compelling governmental interest may justify burdening the individual's free exercise
rights, 0 8 but only if failure to enforce the statute or regulation would
undermine the governmental interest, and the government has employed
the least burdensome means to achieve the interest.10 9
100. Id. at 622-23 (aid to religious schools was likely to set off divisive political activity along
religious lines).
101. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative chaplain did not violate the establishment clause because of the long history of such practices; no Lemon test applied); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (municipal Christmas nativity scenes did not violate the establishment clause because of the historical acceptance of similar practices; Lemon test applied as well).
102. See, eg., L. PFEFFER, supranote 92, at xiii-xiv; Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court:
Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770 (1984).
103. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985); Wallace v. Jafiree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
104. The modem free exercise clause analysis was established in Sherbert v. Verer, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
105. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
106. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
107. Id. at 716-17 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
108. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
109. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-23; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. Two cases in the Burger Court's final
term suggest that various levels of scrutiny might be employed in different contexts. For example, a
highly deferential standard was used in judging a free-exercise challenge to military uniform regulations. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986). Also, a three-member plurality in
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), suggested that in cases in which a government regulation only
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The Court's retention of separate analyses for establishment and free
exercise clause claims created tension between the two clauses. For example, a statute intended to protect the free exercise rights of an individual could violate the establishment clause's proscriptions against

governmental support of religion." t0 Similarly, a judicially created exemption from a general statutory requirement on free exercise grounds
might also impinge on establishment concerns."' The Burger Court did
little to resolve this tension, except to note its existence and to seek a
12
neutral path between the two clauses.1
Although the doctrine of the religion clauses remained relatively
consistent during the tenure of the Burger Court, the results that this
doctrine produced seemed somewhat inconsistent.' 1 3 Moreover, the in-

terpretations of various Justices not only differed from one another, but
these interpretations also changed over time and in different circum-

stances. Therefore, it is difficult to draw conclusions about interpretive
approaches of the Justices, especially since the principal source of insight

into interpretation is their written opinions, which may only illuminate
part of the interpretive process.
Although the Justices agreed on few issues, they all agreed that the
words of the religion clauses do not have a plain meaning. As the Chief
Justice suggested in Lemon, the language of the religion clauses is "at
indirectly or incidentally requires a choice between obtaining a government benefit and following
religious beliefs, is facially neutral, and evidences no intent to discriminate, the regulation is justified
by a showing that it is "a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id. at 708.
But see id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
110. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down a state
statute that granted employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath) with TWA v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (construing the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, requiring reasonable accommodation of employee religious beliefs and practices by employers, to mean
only de minimis accommodation).
111. Such were the charges made in response to free exercise cases such as Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
414-16 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 722-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719-20; Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), Chief Justice Burger suggested:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger
cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection
of values promoted by the right of free exercise.
Id. at 220-21. Also, in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court noted that Congress
could constitutionally create an exemption to a general legislative proscription or regulation so long
as the "exemption is tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes." Id. at 454.
113. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 111 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 671 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
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best opaque,""' 4 and the Justices often lamented the difficulties of interpreting the religion clauses.1 15 Because the plain meaning of the words
of the religion clauses provided little guidance on their own, the Justices
chose methods of interpretation other than strict textualism.
1. Development of the Dominant Originalist Interpretation
In Everson v. Board of Education,1 6 the Supreme Court's first modem establishment clause case, the Court adopted what became the dominant originalist interpretation of the religion clauses. Justice Black,
writing for the Court in Everson, embraced the church-state separationist
views of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson as reflected in Madison's
Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst ReligiousAssessments 117 and Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, enacted by Virginia.' 1 8 Justice
Black asserted that because Madison and Jefferson had played leading
roles in the drafting and adoption of the first amendment, their views
represented the intent of the Framers. Relying on Madison's and Jefferson's desire to end governmental support of the established church, the
originalist analysis of Everson suggested that the Framers intended to
prohibit all aid to all religions.' 9
114. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
115. Justice White, with no small degree of understatement, summed up the state of the establishment clause doctrine:
Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among
ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country. What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and
absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the case until the continuing interaction between the courts and the States . . . produces a single, more
encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
116. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
117. Id. at 63-72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting (Appendix)).
118. Id. at 12-13.
119. Id. at 13. From this basis, Black concluded:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and state."
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). However, it should be
noted that the Supreme Court never fully followed the dictates of the Madison-Jefferson originalism.
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Although many criticized the meaning that this view of original intent gave to the establishment clause, 120 the view remained the dominant
originalist position of the Court. 121 For example, in the Burger Court's
first religion clause case, Walz v. Tax Commission,121 the Chief Justice
claimed that "[i]t would serve no useful purpose to review in detail the

background of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First

Amendment." 12 3 The originalism of Everson, at least for the early part
of the Burger years, provided a relatively uncontroverted basis for the
124
original intent doctrine of the Court.
As a form of moderate originalism, the dominant originalist view

provided only a vague basis of analysis for establishment and free exercise clause challenges. Although this originalist perspective suggested
two purposes of the religion clauses, separation and neutrality, 12 these

broadly stated purposes offered little concrete guidance. As Chief Justice
Burger often remarked, "total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense." 12 6 Nevertheless, several Justices relied on the dominant originalist perspective to explain the political entanglement element of the

Lemon test, asserting that "political division along religious lines was one
of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect."'' 27 Because the Everson originalist perspective dominated, other

originalist interpretations played a minimal role in most of the majority
opinions of the Burger Court.

Despite the popularity of the dominant originalist perspective, the
In Everson itself, the Court allowed a state program providing reimbursement of money expended
for the transportation of students to church-affiliated schools. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
at 17-18; Id. at 28-29 (Rutledge, J.,dissenting). See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952) (Justice Douglas noting that "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being").
120. See generally M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); Bradley, Imagining the Past and Remembering the Future: The Supreme Court's History of the Establishment
Clause, 18 CONN. L. REv. 827 (1986).
121. See Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 706 (1986).
122. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
123. Id. at 667-68.
124. Id. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760,
770 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 n.9 (1972).
125. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803-05 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-47 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1971). Cf., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694
(1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the two goals of the establishment clause were neutrality and voluntarism).
126. See Walz, 403 U.S. at 670; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
127. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
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Court often diverted from the strict separationist message of that viewpoint, 128 which prompted some Justices to restate the intent of the religion clauses attributed to Madison and Jefferson with greater force.
These minority views, which adopted a more forceful conception of the
strict-separationist intent of Madison and Jefferson, had limited influence
on the development of the Court's religion-clause doctrine.
Justice Douglas, in particular, relied heavily on the writings of
Madison to support his interpretations of the religion clauses. In Douglas' opposition to the Court's holding that tax exemptions for churches
were constitutional in Walz, he referred to Madison as the "author and
chief promoter" of the religion clauses,12 9 and contended that although
"[w]hat Madison would have thought of [tax exemptions for churches]
no one can say with certainty," it was apparent that Madison opposed
"all state subsidies to churches" of any kind. 13 0
Particularly in the earlier cases of the Burger Court, Justice Brennan
employed a moderate originalist justification for his interpretation of the
religion clauses which has derived from an analysis developed in previous
Warren Court cases. In the pre-Burger Court case of School District of
Abington v. Schempp,'3 ' Brennan had undertaken an extensive inquiry
into the intent of the Framers, leading him to the conclusion regarding
the establishment clause, that "the line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and
faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers."' 3 2 His
originalist inquiry, like that in Everson, relied heavily on the views of
Madison and Jefferson.' 3 3 Brennan claimed that "[w]hat the Framers
meant to foreclose ... are those involvements ... which (a) serve the
essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means
'
would suffice." 134
Nevertheless, Brennan cautioned that original intent
128. Illustrative of the Court's shift away from the strict separationist message of the MadisonJefferson intent is Chief Justice Burger's comment that "the line of separation [between church and
state], far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
129. Walk, 397 U.S. at 705-06 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 712-13 (Douglas, J. dissenting). See also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 633-34 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 696-97 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
132. Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 234-37 (Brennan, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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135
was only a starting point, not the end of the interpretive process.
Brennan relied on this moderate originalist approach in several of
the early Burger Court religion clause cases. 136 For example, in Walz,
Brennan found it significant that both Jefferson and Madison had been
silent when tax exemptions were granted to churches in Washington,
D.C. and Virginia. 137 He also noted that there had been no comment
about tax exemptions in the congressional and ratification debates, despite the widespread existence of such exemptions for churches both during the colonial period and thereafter.13 8 By contrast, although Brennan
used the same approach in Lemon, he concluded that because public education scarcely existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the
Framers' intent could provide no guidance on the issue of state aid to
private, religiously-affiliated schools. 139 Nevertheless, he claimed that
the state subsidization of religious schools involved the "'dangers, as

much to church as to state, which the Framers feared would subvert
religious liberty and the strength of a system of secular government.' "140
Interestingly, in later cases, Brennan abandoned this originalism as a
method of interpretation."a1
The dominant originalist perspective, emphasizing the views of

Madison and Jefferson, was not significantly challenged within the Burger Court until quite late in the Chief Justice's tenure. Justice Rehnquist

was one of the most outspoken critics of the Court's interpretation of the
135. Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan maintained that "[a] too literal quest
for the advice of the Founding Fathers" was misguided. Id. at 237 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Brennan noted, "'it is [afterall] a constitution we are expounding.'" Id. at 230 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). Moreover, Brennan asserted,
the historical record on a particular practice is often ambiguous. Although the problem uppermost
in the minds of the Framers was the prevention of an American counterpart of the Church of England, the Framers, Brennan contended, surely had a broader principle of church-state separation in
mind. Id. at 237 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Finally, present-day society has changed so dramatically
since 1787, that recourse to the Framers' intent alone could not provide a useful guide to resolving
modem constitutional problems. Id. at 238-40 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, even when he approached religion clause problems from an originalist perspective, Brennan's originalism was at most
moderate, and definitely incorporated nonoriginalist elements. See also infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
136. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 770-71 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 750 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 642-43 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680-81 (1970).
137. Walz, 397 U.S. at 684-85 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
138. Id. at 682-85 (Brennan, J., concurring).
139. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 645 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
140. Id. at 649 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J.,concurring)).
141. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
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religion clauses, 142 but his critique became an attack on the Court's de-

scription of the Framers' intent in 1985. In Thomas v. Review Board,143
Rehnquist's discussion of the reasons for the apparent tension between
the religion clauses foreshadowed his own strict originalist interpretation
of the religion clauses. Rehnquist argued in Thomas that the Court had
strayed from the intent of the Framers and had engaged in an "overly

expansive interpretation of both Clauses." 1" Thus, the tension between
the two clauses, of the Court's own making, could be resolved by a
proper, more restrictive interpretation of the religion clauses that would
be more harmonious with the original intent of the Framers.1 4 5
In Wallace v. Jaffree, 4 6 the Alabama "moment of silence" case, Jus-

tice Rehnquist wrote a lengthy dissent which rejected the dominant Everson originalism. The attack came on two levels, disputing both the

method of dominant moderate originalism, which took into account
other sources of meaning beyond the specific intent of the Framers, and
the resulting conclusions about the Framers' intent. In particular, Rehn-

quist argued that the dominant originalist position was built "upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history."1 47

In Rehnquist's

view, the position's principle flaw was its reliance on Madison and Jefferson as representatives of the Framers' intent.148 After examining the
congressional and ratification debates, the actions of the First Congress
and the early Presidents, and the writings of Joseph Story and Thomas
142. See, eg., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
143. 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, Rehnquist cited the growth of social
welfare legislation and the incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth amendment as
possible causes for the increased tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Id. at
721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Ironically, Rehnquist, who would espouse a strict originalist interpretation of the establishment clause just a few years later, noted that "[b]ecause those who drafted
and adopted the First Amendment could not have foreseen either the growth of social welfare legislation or the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, we simply do
not know how they would view the scope of the two Clauses." Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
147. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist's revision of original intent followed closely
from R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION
(1982). See also Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (1986).
148. Jefferson, Rehnquist noted, was in France at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Also, Rehnquist argued that a
review of the congressional debates illustrated that Madison's views of strict separation as represented in his Memorial and Remonstrance were not shared by others in Congress or by those involved in ratification. Id. at 92-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Cooley,14 9 Rehnquist concluded that the "true meaning"'15 of the estab-

lishment clause was that "it forbade establishment of a national religion,
and forbade preferences among religious sects or denominations." 15
Rehnquist added that it did not, however, require government to be
"strictly neutral between religion and irreligion" nor did it "prohibit
Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through
'
nondiscriminatory sectarian means." 152
According to Rehnquist, the

metaphor of a "wall of separation," adopted from the dominant originalist view of Jefferson, had resulted in a "mischievous diversion of judges
from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights," and
"should be frankly and explicitly abandoned."1'53
2.

The Use of History

Beyond the various forms of originalism espoused by the members

of the Court, historical acceptance of a challenged practice has played an

important role in religion clause doctrine. Three cases in particular,
Walz
5 ' and Lynch v. Donnelly 156
154
Chambers,
v.
Marsh
v. Tax Commission,
illustrate that a long history of acceptance of a challenged practice has
weighed in favor of the practice's constitutionality. The use of the histor-

ical-acceptance justification was, however, somewhat different in Walz
from its use in Marsh and Lynch.

Chief Justice Burger's views on the role of history compared to
those of Justice Brennan in these cases, illustrates the contrast among the
three cases. For example, both Burger and Brennan agreed in Walz that
149. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist added that even though the Everson
originalism had been embraced in many opinions, its mere repetition did not make it correct.
"[S]tare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of
history." Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also generally Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TFx. L. REv. 693 (1976). Justice White expressed a readiness to reevaluate the
history of the religion clauses and an acceptance of Rehnquist's strict originalism. Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger in later cases adopted an increasingly narrower analysis of religion clause issues that was justified, at least partially, on originalist
grounds similar to those of Rehnquist. See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2154, 2156 n.17 (1986);
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 88-91 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
154. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
155. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
156. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the "undeviating acceptance given religious tax exemptions from our ear' bolstered the conclusion that such tax exempliest days as a Nation"157

tions furthered the goals of neutrality and separation by avoiding church-

state entanglement. 158 Thus, in Walz, historical acceptance alone supported but did not create a conclusion of constitutionality.1 59 By con-

trast, Burger and Brennan sharply disagreed about the relevance of the
pattern of historical acceptance in Marsh and Lynch. Clearly, Burger's
historical-acceptance justification in Marsh had a distinctly originalist element. The Chief Justice, noted in Marsh that the same Congress which
had passed the first amendment had accepted legislative chaplains for
two centuries. Thus, Burger suggested that "[c]learly the men who wrote
the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment."1 0
However, in Lynch, Burger could not point to a similar history of acceptance of the practice of erecting municipal nativity scenes. Instead, Burger noted the "unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at
least 1789. '' l1l This historical record, Burger contended, weighed
against a rigid, or strict separationist, interpretation of the religion
clauses. 162
Brennan was highly critical of this use of history, and suggested that
"absent the Court's invocation of history, there would be no question

that the practice at issue was unconstitutional."' 63 According to Brennan, unlike Walz, in which the historical experience supported an other-

wise constitutional practice of tax exemptions for churches, Marsh and
Lynch were examples of the use of history to constitutionalize otherwise
157. Walz v. Tax Cornm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 672-74, 685-92 (Brennan, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 678. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 645-49 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
160. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). Burger noted that Madison himself was part
of the House Committee appointed to select a chaplain and voted for the bill authorizing payment of
the chaplain. Id. at 788 n.8.
161. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). Burger cited the examples of the proclamations making Thanksgiving and Christmas national holidays, the national motto of "In God We
Trust," and the line in the Pledge of Allegiance, "One Nation Under God." Id. at 675-77.
162. Id. at 678. By contrast, in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), in which the Court
struck down a provision of the Tennessee State Constitution disqualifying ministers from serving as
delegates to the state constitutional convention, the Chief Justice rejected the historical evidence that
many of the Framers supported such provisions and that many states retained such provisions
through the nineteenth century. Id. at 622-26.
163. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 814 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 718 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional practices. Moreover, in Brennan's view, the use of history in Lynch was inappropriate because the Court had not limited its
historical inquiry to the specific practice. Instead, the court had included
governmental acknowledgments of religion in general.'
Brennan maintained that if the historical-acceptance exception was not narrowly restricted to only the practice in question, the exception could easily
swallow the Lemon rule.
In summary, the Burger Court experienced several developments in
its use of originalist interpretation and the use of history in religion
clause cases. First, the majority of the Court adopted the dominant moderate originalist view that relied on Madison and Jefferson as the principal representatives of the Framers. The acceptance of the dominant
originalist perspective was accompanied by the opposing moderate
originalist interpretations of Justices Douglas and Brennan who argued
for a strict separationist reading of the religion clauses. Later, criticism
of the dominant originalist interpretation developed, led primarily by
Justice Rehnquist, and the Court began to turn to the historical-acceptance justification, promoted largely by Chief Justice Burger.
3.

Nonoriginalism

Several members of the Burger Court adopted a nonoriginalist interpretive approach in response to several developments in the latter half of
the Burger Court's tenure. These developments included the criticism of
the dominant originalist perspective, the increased use of the historicalacceptance justification, and the general frustration and dissatisfaction
expressed both inside and outside the Court with the state of religion
clause jurisprudence. The leading spokesmen for this nonoriginalist position were Justices Brennan165 and Douglas.
Justice Brennan, after discarding his earlier moderate originalist approach, advanced a forceful nonoriginalist interpretation of the religion
clauses. His strongest statement on nonoriginalist interpretation of the
religion clauses came in his caustic dissent in Marsh. In his dissent, he
argued that the Constitution was not "a static document whose meaning
164. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that without focusing only on
the particular challenged practice, "the Court is at sea, free to select random elements of America's
varied history solely to suit the views of five members of this Court.") Justice Brennan also
presented a nonoriginalist attack against the use of history. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
165. See generally Brennan, The Constitutionof the United States: ContemporaryRatification, 27
S.TEx. L. REv.433 (1986) (address at Georgetown University, October 12, 1985).
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on every detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers."' 166 Moreover, according to Brennan, the "inherent adaptability" of
the Constitution was important for the religion clauses, given the tremendous changes in the religious makeup of the nation.' 67 Brennan insisted
that the Framers should not be viewed as "sacred figures whose every
action must be emulated, but as authors of a document meant to last for
ages."' 168 Similarly, in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger,169 Brennan
spoke of the prophetic or visionary nature of the religion clauses and the
Court's role to develop that vision:
Through our Bill of Rights, we pledged ourselves to attain a level of
human freedom and dignity that had no parallel in history. Our constitutional commitment to religious freedom and to acceptance of religious pluralism is one of our greatest achievements in that noble
endeavor. Almost 200 years after the First Amendment was drafted,
tolerance and respect for all religions still set us apart from most other
shores refugees from religious persecution
countries and draws to our
170
from around the world.
Furthermore, Brennan commented that one of the critical functions of
the religion clauses was to protect the rights of minority religions from
"quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority
beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar."' 17 1 Thus,
Brennan's nonoriginalism had two components: the prophetic goal of
improving religious pluralism and toleration, and the special role of the
Court as protector of minority rights.
The opinions of Justice Douglas also reflected a nonoriginalist approach to interpretation of the religion clauses. For example, in his lone
dissent in Gillette v. United States,' 72 Douglas sought to justify an interpretation of the free exercise clause that included freedom of conscience
as well as religion. In demonstrating the propriety of constitutional protection of the freedom of conscience, he quoted Tolstoy on the nature of
166. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
asserted that "[o]ur primary task must be to translate 'the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century ... ' Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)). See
also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 817 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
170. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objector to military draft).
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the moral compulsion of the human conscience.1 73 Although
"[c]onscience is often but the echo of religious faith.., it may also be the
product of travail, meditation, or sudden revelation related to a moral
compulsion of the dimension of a problem." 17 4 Thus, in Douglas' view,
the full protection of the rights of free exercise required an expansive
interpretation including the freedom of conscience.
4.

Neutral Principles, "Tests," and Precedent

In addition to the Burger Court's originalist and nonoriginalist interpretations of the religion clauses, the Court attempted to fashion principles for adjudicating religion clause issues in a neutral manner. In
theory, the neutral principles approach requires the development of generalized rules of law that have force beyond an individual case and are
consistently applied in later cases. The Lemon "test" is the most obvious
example of an attempt to utilize neutral principles. Similarly, several
Justices claimed that the precedents of the Court provided a sufficiently
well-developed guide to interpretation. Nevertheless, many of the members of the Court found these constraints on interpretation wanting in
several respects.
Although every member of the Court who wrote for a majority accepted the Lemon analysis as a binding basis for interpretation,1 7 S various Justices characterized the principles of the Lemon test differently.
This raises serious questions about just how neutral these principles are
in their application. Whereas some Justices applied the test loosely, considering factors such as historical acceptance of the challenged practice
or the governmental interest supporting the practice, other Justices applied the test more rigidly.
Chief Justice Burger was the author of the "tripartite test." Having
distilled the concept of "tests" from past cases, 176 Burger announced the
173. Id. at 466-67 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting L. ToLSTOY, WRITINGS ON CIVIL DIsOmEDIENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE 12 (1967)).

174. Id. at 465-66 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
175. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Stevens, J);
School Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (Brennan, J.); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Stewart, J.); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (White, J.); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
(Blackmun, J.); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Burger, C.J.).
176. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968).
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three-part inquiry as "tests" in Lemon.' 7 7 However, Burger later referred to the three criteria as "guideposts," or "signposts."' 17 8 In several
cases, Burger reproved other members of the Court for their rigid application of the Lemon criteria as tests.17 9 Burger saw the Lemon "test" as
a flexible investigation that did not necessarily exhaust the possible interpretive analysis.' 0 The debate over whether the criteria should be applied rigidly as "tests" or flexibly as "guideposts" constituted more than
just quibbling over labels; it reflected an underlying debate about the nature of the principles to be used in interpreting the religion clauses.
As the Lemon test was subjected to increasing criticism and certain
members of the Court tried to weaken the test with the historical-acceptance exception, other Justices supported the Lemon test and sought its
strict application. Justice Brennan was, in Burger's view, the principal
member of the Court to apply the Lemon test rigidly. Although Brennan had originally developed his own three-part test,18 he eventually
came to embrace and apply the Lemon test with greater vigor than the
test's author. 182 In fact, Brennan garnered a majority in two 1985 cases
that rejuvenated the threatened Lemon analysis. 8 3 Similarly, in the face
of a sharp attack on the Lemon test by Justice Rehnquist,I8 4 Justice Powell contended that its standards had "proved useful in analyzing case after case" and were "the only coherent test a majority of the Court has
ever adopted."' 8 5
Unsatisfied with the analyses and the results of the Lemon test, Justices White and O'Connor proposed alternatives to this test. Justice
White never fully accepted the Lemon test, and with the exception of two
177. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
178. See, eg., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
679 (1984); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 359 (1975) (Stewart J., plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
179. See, eg., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wallace,
472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
180. See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 419 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
181. See supra text accompanying note 132. See also, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 693-96
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 642-43 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 704 n. 11(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Meek, 421 U.S. at 373-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 697-98 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
183. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985).
184. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also supra notes
143-50 and accompanying text.
185. Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
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cases for which he wrote the majority opinion,"8 6 White adopted a balancing test for the establishment clause. The result of this balancing approach in the school aid cases, for example, was that the strong state
interest in promoting education would, in White's view, justify the
breach of church-state separation.18 7 More recently, Justice O'Connor
has sought to clarify religion clause doctrine and to develop neutral principles for both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
O'Connor has attempted to give analytical content to the purpose and
effect prongs of the Lemon test by suggesting that a court must examine
whether a statute's purpose is to endorse religion and whether its effect
actually imparts a message of endorsement.1 88 For free exercise cases,
O'Connor has proposed a test in which the state must demonstrate that
an "unusually important interest is at stake," and that granting an exemption "will do substantial harm to that interest" in order to deny a
free exercise claim."8 9 Nevertheless, O'Connor's clarification has not received support from other members of the Court, nor is it entirely clear
that her "tests" prove to be more neutral than the existing principles.
The debate and disageement over the nature of the Lemon test, as
well as the sometimes inconsistent results of the religion clause cases,
illustrate that the Burger Court was unsuccessful in transforming its
"tests" into a set of neutral principles for interpreting the language of the
first amendment. Similarly, the Court's precedents provided only limited
guidance in interpreting the religion clauses, as evidenced by the fractured pluralities on several issues,19 the divergent interpretations of the
precedents, 19 ' and the rejection of the precedents by some members of
186. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
187. See, eg., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 90 (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral Academy,
434 U.S. 125, 135 (1977) (White J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 76770 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 664 (1971) (White,
J., concurring). But cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455-62 (1971) (Court, concluding
that regulation limiting conscientious objector status to only those who objected to all wars was not
an establishment clause violation, stressed the importance of the interests served by the regulation).
188. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421-22 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-92 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). See generally Choper, The Religion Clausesof the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 675 (1980) ("[T]he Establishment Clause should forbid only
government action whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely to impair religious freedom by
coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs") (emphasis omitted).
189. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Bowen v.
Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2166 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
190. See, eg., Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
191. CompareLynch, 465 U.S. at 695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to well-established
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192

D. Church and State and Compromise in the Supreme Court
The impact of compromise on interpretation of the religion clauses
is illustrated by comparing the various interpretive positions of different
members of the Court when they were writing for the majority as opposed to when they wrote separately. Justice Brennan, for example, had
at first adopted a moderate originalist justification for his interpretations
of the religion clauses and developed a three-part test of his own. He was
unable, however, to persuade other Justices to follow this view. In the
early years of the Burger Court, the cost of maintaining his individual
position was relatively small, since the majority reached the same result
as Brennan did under his own interpretation.19 By contrast, as the
Lemon test came under increasing attack and faced a serious threat of
being weakened if not completely rejected, Brennan abandoned his earlier analysis and adopted a nonoriginalist justification for strict application of the Lemon criteria. Concommitant with his consolidation of a
strong minority voting bloc, 194 Brennan's new position captured a majority in several important establishment clause cases in the later years of
the Burger Court.1 95
A different story can be told of Justices Rehnquist and White.
Rehnquist consistently criticized the Lemon approach and ultimately rejected it on strict originalist grounds. Yet, on the occasion in which he
spoke for a majority of the Court, he employed the Lemon test. 196 In
doing so, he was able to damage it somewhat.19 7 Similarly, Justice White
consistently rejected the Lemon doctrine in his separate opinions, but
was nonetheless willing to accommodate other members of the court in
order to write a majority opinion that applied the Lemon test weakly.1 91
precedent) with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
precedent was "neither principled nor unified").
192. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Id. at 91 (White, J.,
dissenting).
193. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (majority opinion) and Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (majority opinion) with Lemon, 403 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring) and Walz, 397 U.S. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
195. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
196. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
197. Id. at 403 n.l1 (suggesting that the political divisiveness element of the entanglement prong
of the Lemon test applied only to the school aid cases).
198. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654-57

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987

41

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:379

Finally, it is useful to compare the opinions of Justices Douglas and
O'Connor, who for the most part were unable to persuade other Justices
of their respective interpretations of the religion clauses. Justice Douglas
had developed a strict separationist interpretation of the religion clauses
based partly on a moderate originalist approach that relied entirely on
the views of Madison. 199 Unlike Brennan, who also had his own interpretation at the time Douglas was a member of the Burger Court, Douglas' independent position cost him substantially in terms of influencing a
majority of the Court.2 0 Justice O'Connor, who joined the Court in the
later part of Burger's tenure, attempted to bring a fresh approach to an
area of constitutional adjudication that had become a fierce battleground.20 1 Her separate opinions spoke as much to future cases as to the
other members of the Court in a particular case. Given the fracturing
and disagreement on religion clause doctrine evident in the Burger
Court's final term,20 2 O'Connor may yet be able to influence a majority
20 3
or possibly a minority bloc.
IV.

INTERPRETATION AFrER COMPROMISE

Evaluating the competing theories of interpretation requires close
scrutiny of the theories' internal coherence or cogency, their conformity
with the constitutional system, and even their potential results. The evaluation also requires inquiry into whether the interpretive methods are
possible in the specific institutions and circumstances in which constitutional interpretation takes place. An important element of that context
in the Supreme Court is the process of compromise. However, in proposing and advocating their theories of interpretation, few commentators
have addressed this critical element. In fact, many of the proposed interpretive methods seem designed for interpretation by a single judge instead of for interpretation by a group of Justices necessarily involved in
the process of compromise.
Constitutional interpretation in the context of compromise is often
(1980) (majority opinion applying Lemon test) with Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 9091 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting Lemon test).
199. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
200. See supra text accompanying note 89.
201. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
203. See, eg., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2873-75 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/2

42

1988]

Kohler: Compromise and Interpretation: A Case Study of the Burger Court a
COMPROMISE AND INTERPRETATION

difficult. The process of compromise, propelled by the institutional prerequisite of a majority, requires that the Justices have the ability to modify and to adjust their interpretations to accommodate other Court
members and to obtain agreement of at least four others. The process of
compromise requires agreement on an interpretation with other members
of the Court, some of whom may use an entirely different method of
interpretation. The concessions that a Justice may have to make in order
to reach majority agreement can contradict or conflict with the conclusions from his or her chosen interpretive method, possibly to the extent
of modifying or even abandoning altogether his or her own interpretive
method.2" Although the challenge of obtaining the agreement of others
can improve and perfect an interpretation, it can nevertheless distort or
manipulate the results of the method of interpretation.
Compromise may create difficulties for a strict originalist approach
to constitutional interpretation. Strict originalism is a rigid, often formalistic method of interpretation, "inviting, if not demanding, arbitrary
manipulation of sources and outcomes. ' 20 5 Lawyers make poor historians. The adversarial nature of the courtroom tends not to be conducive
to historical investigation, encouraging opposing attorneys to emphasize
those bits of historical evidence that support their causes and to ignore
those that do not.2 °6 The process of compromise complicates this situation. Concessions on points of history are easier to accept than doctrinal
concessions. Even assuming that Justices can agree on the appropriate
sources and the requisite weight to be attached to those sources of evidence of the Framers' intent, they may reach different conclusions from
the historical record. Compelled to reach majority agreement, the results
of the originalist inquiry may be an easy basis for compromise. Compromise thus can undermine the integrity of the strict originalist
methodology.
Unlike strict originalism, moderate originalism and nonoriginalism
are flexible interpretive methods which adapt easily to the rigors of compromise. Because neither moderate originalism nor nonoriginalism requires strict adherence to the historical evidence of the Framers' specific
intentions, these approaches are less likely to distort the historical record
204. A Justice can, of course, refuse to make such concessions and maintain the integrity of his
or her interpretive method. See supra text accompanying note 36. Obtaining majority status probably is impossible without some degree of concessions, however.
205. Brest, supra note 31, at 1090.
206. See Tushnet, supra note 26, at 793; Kelly, Clio and the Court An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
Sup. Cr. REV. 119.
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than strict originalism. The moderate originalist or nonoriginalist is free
to consider factors other than the history of the Framers' intent. The
process of compromise therefore is unlikely to trample upon the interpretive methods and outcomes of the moderate originalist or nonoriginalist.
In fact, the process of compromise can serve as a mechanism for tempering and perfecting the interpretation under either interpretive approach.
The quest for neutral principles of adjudication in the religion clause
cases is a prime example of the difficulties facing interpretation in the
context of compromise. The neutral principles approach assumes a
shared method of selecting the principles for interpretation and, moreover, a shared understanding of the content of those principles. These
assumptions in the context of compromise are unrealistic. Despite all the
clamour among the members of the Supreme Court about "tests," established precedents, and well-grounded principles in the doctrine of the
religion clauses, the Court used these principles in anything but a Wechslerian neutral fashion.2 °7
Reaching a majority requires a degree of flexibility that makes the
application of neutral principles practically infeasible. For example, one
might hypothesize that a Justice represents a swing vote in a series of
cases. In one case, the Justice might modify her interpretation, derived
from her own principle, in order to form a majority with four Justices
who have reached the same outcome, albeit from a different principle of
interpretation. In a second case, she might join the other four Justices to
form a new majority conforming with the result from her principle even
though the second set of four Justices also employs a different principle
of decision. 2' The failure of neutrality results neither from dishonesty
nor from a lack of legal craftsmanship on the part of members of the
Court. Rather, the institutional dynamics of compromise undermine the
potential for neutrality.
Unlike a neutral principles approach, compromise does not necessarily undermine an interpretive theory predicated on the judicial norms
of adjudication. 20 9 The compromise process itself provides such rules.
The most obvious example is the requirement of a majority. The individual interpretations of members of the Supreme Court have little impact
unless at least four others agree. Similarly, a Justice who does not comply with the norms of the interpretive community of the Court will not
207. See generally, Wechsler, supra note 5.
208. Mark Tushnet also has identified this shortcoming in the neutral principles approach. See
Tushnet, supra note 26, at 808-09. See also Greenawalt, supra note 38, at 1007-08.

209. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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have his or her interpretations obtain majority status. Although the process of compromise can dovetail with this interpretive approach, the
combination of compromise and other adjudicative rules and judicial
the electorally
norms may still not be an effective enough constraint on
21 0
unaccountable judge to be a useful interpretive theory.
Although these conclusions are drawn largely from a case study of a
specific area of constitutional doctrine, their relevance is not limited to
constitutional interpretation in that one area. The religion clause doctrine of the Burger Court is unique in that it represents an area of constitutional adjudication that has experienced growth, disagreement, and
shifting positions. However, these peculiarities only help to expose the
process of compromise and its effects on interpretation. Moreover, even
if the Burger Court's experience with the religion clauses (the fracturing
and shifting of the members of the Court) has accentuated the impact of
compromise on the Court's interpretation unlike any other area of constitutional doctrine, these are precisely the circumstances that require an
effective method of interpretation.
The problems posed by the process of compromise should not be
overlooked or underestimated. It is not enough to develop a theory of
interpretation without considering the context of compromise in which
interpretation takes place. The impact of compromise is not felt just in
the interaction among Justices in reaching the agreement of a majority.
Rather, the existence of compromise influences each Justice's individual
interpretations. For example, a Justice, faced with the need to compromise to obtain the status of majority, will weigh the likelihood of other
Justices accepting her interpretation, will ponder the possible modifications to improve that likelihood, and then will consider the appropriate
bargaining positions to take in order to promote that interpretation. A
theory of interpretation must therefore contemplate the impact of the
process of compromise on how Justices will use the proposed interpretive
method.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, the final interpreter of the Constitution, is comprised of nine members. Most people like to think that those men and
women appointed to the Court are intelligent and able individuals,
skilled in the legal craft. Occasionally, the actions of the members of the
210. See supra note 51.
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Court serve as a reminder that Justices are still human and suffer from
the same human frailties that all people do. Whether a Justice is highly
skilled or merely competent, however, he or she does not perform the
task of constitutional interpretation alone. A Justice needs the agreement of at least four others to have the force of a majority, and the
achievement of a majority always requires some degree of compromise.
As this case study of the Burger Court's interpretation of the religion clauses illustrates, the process of compromise can have a significant
impact on constitutional interpretation. Moreover, some interpretive
methods adapt less successfully to this process than others. A theory of
interpretation must take into consideration the context in which interpretation takes place. That context is marked by the process of compromise.
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APPENDIX: RELIGION CLAUSE CASES OF THE BURGER COURT

Bender v. Williamsport School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (student religious group meeting in public school; decided on other grounds).
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (exemption from having social security number).
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military dress code exemption for Orthodox Jew).
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S.
619 (1986) (application of state employment discrimination statute to
religious school; decided on other grounds).
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(financial assistance to blind student at religious college).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (aid to religious schools).
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (aid to religious
schools).
Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (statute granting employee right not to work on chosen Sabbath).
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)
(application of Fair Labor Standards Act to religious organization).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) ("moment of silence" in public
schools).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (municipal nativity scene).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative chaplains).
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax credits to parents).
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (tax exemption denied to religious university because of racial discrimination).
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983) (Powell as
Circuit Justice) (prayer in public schools).
Larkin v. Grendel's Den Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (state statute granting
churches veto over liquor licenses).
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (contribution reporting
requirement).
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (social security tax and
Amish).
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (standing under religion

clauses).
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student religious group using
college facilities).
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Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment
benefits to Jehovah's Witness).
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of the ten
commandments).
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (medicaid payments for
abortions).
Committee for Pub. Educ., & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (aid to religious schools).
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (church property dispute).
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (NLRB jurisdiction over religious school teachers).
General Council on Finance & Admin., United Methodist Church v.
California Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1355 (1978) (Rehnquist as Circuit
Justice) (church property dispute).
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (minister as delegate to state constitutional convention).
New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (aid to religious
schools).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (aid to religious schools).
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (exemption from
union contribution).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (license plate motto).
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (aid to private
colleges and universities).
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)
(church property dispute).
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (aid to religious schools).
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (veterans benefits to conscientious objectors).
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (tax credits for students attending religious schools).
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (aid to religious schools).
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973) (aid to religious schools).
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (aid to religious schools).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state compulsory school attendance law and the Amish).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (aid to religious schools).
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (aid to private colleges and
universities).
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Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objectors to
the draft).
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for
churches).
Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam) (church property
dispute).
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